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Resumen
                                                             
En éste trabajo se aplica la teoría de los signos de Juan Poinsot para la evaluación 
de un “buen modelo económico”. Primero se defi ne qué se considera un buen 
modelo, luego se presenta el marco conceptual de Poinsot y se presentan algunas 
ideas actuales acerca de modelos económicos. Luego se muestra cómo se pueden 
combinar las ideas de Poinsot y sobre los modelos. La conclusión es que un buen 
modelo señala posibles causas de los fenómenos bajo estudio las que han de 
verifi carse empíricamente. 
Clasifi cación JEL: A11, B41, C0
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Abstract                                         
                
This paper applies John Poinsot’s doctrine about signs to the evaluation of “good 
economic models”. First, a “good model” is defi ned. Then, Poinsot’s conceptual 
framework and some current ideas about models are introduced. Third, the paper 
shows how Poinsot’s and ideas about models can be combined. The conclusion 
is that a good model raises possible causes of the phenomena under examination, 
which should be then empirically verifi ed. 
JEL Classifi cation: A11, B41, C0
Keywords: economic models -  theory of signs -  causality 
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INTRODUCTION
There are different kinds of models, and different explanations about 
their nature, their role and about the way of building them. This topic has been 
recently extensively explored by philosophers of economics reaching at varied 
positions. Indeed, models are considered as methods for the investigation of stable 
real causes (Cartwright 1999), but also as mediators between theory and data 
(Haavelmo 1944, Morrison and Morgan 1999), as surrogate systems (Mäki 2011), 
as vehicles for testing theories, as thought experiments, as conceptual explorations 
(Hausman 1992), as open formula or frameworks for formulating hypotheses 
(Alexandrova 2008: 200; Guala 2005: Chapter 7), as “credible worlds” (Sugden 
2000 and 2009), as means of communication or telling stories (Dow 2002: 96-8, 
Morgan 1999: 178ff.), as “epistemic warfare” (Magnani 2012) or as analogies 
(Hesse 1966, McMullin 1968). These positions are more or less realists, in the 
sense of attempting or not to explain and capture some truth about the phenomena 
examined.1 
Models can be theoretical or empirical, they can be aimed at merely describe 
a phenomenon or at explaining it. I think that economists – however not all of 
them– are greatly realists: they want to capture some truth about reality because 
they are conscious that truth is relevant for the accuracy of economic policies. I 
consider that there is an implicit agreement among social scientists about what 
makes a “good model.” Through Internet research, interviews with colleagues 
and ideas taken from academic papers I have arrived at the characterization of a 
good model which I will convey here2. A good theoretical model brings to light 
1 I am referring not to scientifi c realism but to epistemic realism, the position holding that “the Xs 
that are claimed to exist are also knowable. Different forms of epistemological realism presuppose 
some versions of ontological realism and semantic realism and add to them the idea of being known 
or being knowable. Epistemological realism says of some existing X that facts about X are known 
or can be known, implying that knowers have epistemic access to X, that there is no veil separating 
the cognitive subject and the existing object” (Mäki 1998, p. 407). Concerning “phenomena” I 
adopt James Woodward and James Bogen’s concept. For them (see Bogen and Woodward 1988 and 
Woodward 1989: 393) phenomena are stable and general features of the world that are beyond data, 
and that can be explained and predicted by general theories. Theories, for them, are not about data, 
but about phenomena. Phenomena, explains Bogen (2009), are processes, causal factors, effects, 
facts, regularities and other pieces of ontological furniture. This implies that knowledge goes beyond 
observation; observations only help us arrive at the knowledge of those kinds of phenomena, a 
theoretical reason’s knowledge.
2 I found the following kinds of assertions about “good models” on the web (www.google.com): “Having 
a good model is synonym of having a low representational gap” (http://www.makinggoodsoftware.
com/2010/05/17/how-to-create-a-good-domain-model-top-10-advices/).  “A good model has to be as 
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some aspects of reality previously unproved or unnoticed. The conclusions of a 
good empirical model should coincide with the available data about the concerned 
situation. Sam Ouliaris (2011) has recently asked and asserted in a publication of 
the IMF under the section “back to basics”: 
What makes a good economic model? Irrespective of the approach, 
the scientifi c method (lots of sciences, such as physics and meteorology, 
create models) requires that every model yield precise and verifi able 
implications about the economic phenomena it is trying to explain. Formal 
evaluation involves testing the model’s key implications and assessing 
its ability to reproduce stylized facts. Economists use many tools to test 
their models, including case studies, lab-based experimental studies, and 
statistics. (…) No economic model can be a perfect description of reality. 
But the very process of constructing, testing, and revising models forces 
economists and policymakers to tighten their views about how an economy 
works.
Paul Teller (2009, p. 235) asserts that “science accomplishes veridical 
accounts through the use of models”, but he clarifi es that we accept a statement 
as true when it is “true enough”, relative to our needs and interests (p. 236). 
Then, when speaking of good modes it is essential to maintain a balance between 
the model’s link with reality and the necessary simplifi cation (isolation and 
idealization) in order to focus on specifi c dimensions or aspects of reality. 
In this paper I will suggest to apply a conceptual instrument, i.e., a specifi c 
conception of signs, for assessing whether a model is a good model. I will base the 
proposal in the realist conception of signs of an ancient and today rather unknown 
Portuguese thinker, Joannes Poinsot (1589-1644), who wrote a Tractatus de signis 
(Treatise on Signs). Poinsot, also known as John of St. Thomas, was one the 
most important representatives of the so-called Conimbricenses (from Coimbra, 
Portugal), a school of 17th Century logicians that developed a highly elaborated 
theory of signs. Let us remind that in medieval times a very rich theory of semiotics 
has been expounded (see Meier-Oeser 2003). 
close to the real system as possible; at the same time, it should not be too diffi cult or complicated to 
use for analyzing the behavior of the system. That means, a good model should be realistic enough 
so that the results of the model can give a fairly realistic description of how the system would behave 
under certain changes. At the same time, a good model should also be easy to use.” (http://www.soi.
wide.ad.jp/class/20070042/slides/08/6.html). For Frits Vaandrager, (Radboud University Nijmegen) a 
good model has a clearly specifi ed object of modeling and purpose, is traceable, is truthful, simple, 
extensible and reusable (http://www.cs.ru.nl/~fvaan/PV/what_is_a_good_model.html).
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MODELS AS SIGNS
R. I. G. Hughes, for example, points to the importance that models maintain 
a connection with reality when he asserts that “the characteristic –perhaps the only 
characteristic– that all theoretical models have in common is that they provide 
representation of parts of the world, or of the world as we describe it” (1997, p. 
S325). On the other hand, Joan Robinson (as many others) points to the balance 
between realism and simplifi cation when she remarks (1971, p. 141): 
It is easy enough to make models on stated assumptions. The 
diffi culty is to fi nd the assumptions that are relevant to reality. The art is 
to set up a scheme that simplifi es the problem as to make it manageable 
without eliminating the essential character of the actual situation on which 
it is intended to throw light. 
Keynes’ passage about models taken from his July 4, 1938 letter to Harrod 
is very well known. His concern was to detect the causes of changes in particular 
situations. He asserts: “Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models 
joined to the art of choosing models which are relevant to the contemporary 
world…. The object of a model is to segregate the semi-permanent or relatively 
constant factors from those which are transitory or fl uctuating so as to develop a 
logical way of thinking about the latter” (1973, pp. 296-297). For him, models are 
“instruments of thought” (1973, p. 299) highly adapted to the target situation by an 
intimate acquaintance to the facts that it intends to explain. That is, a model makes 
reference to realities in a specifi c way. 
At this point, I wish to introduce Poinsot’s doctrine about signs. For him, 
a sign is “that which represents something other than itself to a cognitive power” 
(1985, p. 25). He thus classifi es signs in this way (1985, p. 27): 
[I]nsofar as signs are ordered to a [knowing] power, they are 
divided into formal and instrumental signs; but insofar as signs are ordered 
to something signifi ed, they are divided according to the cause of that 
ordering into natural and stipulative and customary. A formal sign is the 
formal awareness which represents of itself, not by means of another. An 
instrumental sign is one that represents something other than itself from 
a pre-existing cognition of itself as an object, as the footprint of an ox 
represents an ox. And this defi nition is usually given for signs generally. A 
natural sign is one that represents from the nature of a thing, independently 
of any stipulation and custom whatever, and so it represents the same for 
all, as smoke signifi es a fi re burning. A stipulated sign is one that represents 
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something owing to an imposition by the will of a community, like the 
linguistic expression “man.” A customary sign is one that represents from 
use alone without any public imposition, as napkins upon the table signify 
a meal. 
The following table will clarify this classifi cation: 
Table 1- Poinsot’s Classifi cation of Symbols
According to Poinsot’s conception, words (as “fi re”) are considered 
instrumental and customary or conventional signs, while thoughts or concepts 
(as the concept of fi re) are formal and natural signs of the apprehended reality. 
Poinsot’s formal sign directly remits to a real reference. Leo Apostel (1961, p. 
15) asserts that “the mind needs in one act to have an overview of the essential 
characteristics of a domain.” This is performed by a “formal sign”. 
This conceptual framework is in accordance with some current ideas about 
models. Uskali Mäki (2011) distinguishes between the model (“the imagined 
world, possessing the characteristics provided by the set of idealizing assumptions 
and missing characteristics of real world situations”) and the description of the 
model (mathematic, verbal, geometric). In the same vein, Pierre Salmon (2000 and 
2005) distinguishes between: 
- the real world with all its complexity;
- the isolated or “target system” (i.e., the aspect of the real world, isolated 
from its context, that we try to explain and understand);
- the model or “model described”; and 
- the description of the model or “describer model”. 
-Natural: Smoke and concept of fi re 
-Conventional: the word “fi re”  or drawing 
of a fl ame
According to their 
relationship to their 
meaning
-Formal: deals directly with what it represents
- Instrumental: smoke and word “fi re”
     
According its 
relationship  with what 
is represented: with the 
cognoscent 
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An additional step in the assessing or building of a good model would 
be that the “describer model” actually serves as an instrumental and customary 
representation or sign, and the “model described” as a formal and natural sign of 
the real connections between the variables of the isolated target system. 
If we accept the last step proposed for building a good model, the described 
model should bring the knower to the real connections concerned in a way that 
allows him to understand them directly. We do not need to fi x our attention on the 
model per se but rather directly grasp the relation of concepts that it expresses. In 
this way, knowledge “passes through models” towards the known relation. For 
example, using a golf metaphor, a good stroke highly depends on continuing the 
swing down with a good “follow through.” Just as if you stop the swing at the 
ball the stroke is ineffective, if knowledge stopped at the model itself, it would be 
ineffective as well. 
One may ask, however, whether the belief in this relation is true, i.e., 
whether it is strictly speaking knowledge3. This is one of the characteristic of 
my vision of a “good model”. Models, however, are fallible. As such, their truth 
depends on the empirical existence of the concepts that they denote united by 
the relation that they postulate. In other words, are the concepts denoted by 
the model actually related in the way expressed by the model? If the answer is 
affi rmative the model is true. The aim of scientifi c inquiry is to determine the 
truth of the model. Consequently, to prove that a model is a “good model” we 
need to have access to the information required to confi rm it. Obviously, if the 
model is a theoretical model we need to derive empirical propositions that can 
be verifi ed with existing data. 
3 According to a longstanding philosophical tradition, knowledge is by defi nition a true belief. From the 
days of Plato to the present, knowledge is, for most scholars, justifi ed true belief.( See, for example, R. 
K. Shope, “Propositional Knowledge”, in J. Dancy and E. Sosa (1992), A Companion to Epistemology, 
Oxford: Blackwell, or M. Steup, “The Analysis of Knowledge”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http: //plato.Stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/.) Thus, the least we can assign to 
knowledge is to be ‘factive’ (to presuppose the truth), i.e., if we know that p, then it is the case that 
p. We cannot know something that is not in fact.  This does not portray our intelligence as infallible. 
If the known proposition is not true, an epistemic state of mere belief will emerge, different from an 
epistemic state of knowledge. Keynes asserts: “Thus knowledge of a proposition always corresponds 
to certainty of rational belief in it and at the same time to actual truth in the proposition itself. We 
cannot know a proposition unless it is in fact true” ([1921] 1973, p. 11). Closer to Keynes than Plato 
or contemporary philosophers, Bertrand Russell affi rms: “[S]ome propositions are true and some false, 
just as some roses are red and some white; that belief is a certain attitude towards propositions, which 
is called knowledge when they are true, error when they are false” (1904: 523).
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Finally, what is the kind of relation expressed by a “good model”? At the 
beginning of the paper I asserted that most economists are realists. However, I 
have to recognize that some economists only aim to know which variables are 
“determined” (and hence “explained” but not necessarily really caused) by the 
model and which not. In fact, they usually do not need more than this and it is 
suffi ciently useful for provide an explanation and predict. However, I maintain that 
a “good model” is not satisfi ed with only knowing which variables are determined, 
but that it aims at knowing the real causes acting at play in the situation under 
analysis. Why? Because, as it is very well known, correlation without causation 
makes for very imperfect knowledge and economists want to accurately predict 
and to propose trustable economic policies. 
The quest to discover causes is as old as Aristotle. He states: “Plainly we 
are seeking the cause. And this is the essence (…) which in some cases is the 
end (…) and in some cases is the fi rst mover” (Metaphysics VII, 17 1041a 27-
30; see 1041b 10ff.). He also asserts: “We suppose ourselves to possess scientifi c 
knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing in the accidental way in which the 
sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends” 
(Posterior Analytics I, 2, 71b 8-11). Also nowadays there is a growing current 
in the philosophy of science holding that scientifi c explanation must be causal 
explanation (see, e.g., Nancy Cartwright 1989, Jim Woodward 1989). Specifi cally, 
for example, Cartwright (2009, p. 20) asserts: “the function of a model is to 
demonstrate the reality of a capacity” (for her, a capacity is a stable cause). 
For Henry Veatch a scientifi c hypothesis “leads to a recognition of a causal 
order underlying and making intelligible the connections between the various 
objects of knowledge” (1952: 330). For him, these hypotheses “would seem to 
be instruments for intending the causal order and structure of what is given in 
experience” (1952: 331). I indeed think that this is what economists should look 
for in models. Specifi cally, for example, Larry Boland (1989, Chapter 6 and 2009) 
claims that “every model can be seen to be positing a causal mapping.” This is the 
describer model. He adds that “every explanation of observed events (…) implies 
a conjectured cause-effect relationship” (2010, p. 536). The simplifi cation that 
a “good model” entails should be then aimed at detecting the relevant causes. 
Caterina Marchionni suggests that “some of the unrealistic elements of economic 
models serve the function of fi xing the causal background” (2006, p. 426). 
Do we need that all models reveal causes? Not all the types of models need 
to reveal causation. Beyond all the possible kinds of models, however, there is 
a reason why the social fi eld suggests the quest of causes. Whatever conception 
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we hold about the connection of events within the social fi eld, i.e., teleological 
connections, reasons for action, intentional causation (Searle 2001), there is a 
growing agreement about what in ordinary language we would call “cause”. This 
is why it seems that to express or reveal a cause, however not being a necessary 
condition, is a suffi cient and convenient condition of good models. It is opportune 
to hear actual economists. For example, Kindleberger asserts (1965: 40):
An economic model is a statement of relationships among economic 
variables. Its purpose is to illustrate causal relations among critical variables 
in the real world, stripped of irrelevant complexity, for the sake of obtaining 
a clearer understanding of how the economy operates, and in some 
formulations, in order to manipulate it. 
The verbs “to operate”, and “to manipulate” actually refers to causes4. A 
good model that reveals the causes is good for explanation, for prediction and for 
policy. I recognize that this leaves some problems up for discussion: the defi nition 
and classifi cation of causes; how to recognize and measure them; as well as the 
existence, the stability, and knowledge of social causes (see, e.g., John Hicks 1979, 
Cartwright 2007). However, we may broadly maintain that a “good model” should 
postulate a hypothesis about the causes at work in the analyzed situation. Perhaps 
Anna Alexandrova (2008, p. 396) proposal of models as “open formulae” is too 
weak, but it is close to my idea. She proposes that “models are used as suggestions 
for developing causal hypotheses that can be tested by an experiment. I would say 
that “good models” postulate testable causal hypotheses.
Then, we need to prove this hypothesis. We must take into account that given 
the local and contingent character of the social fi eld we may easily make mistakes. 
In fact, there is a tradeoff between precision and accuracy (see Paul Teller 2008). 
We must then perform an empirical verifi cation. As Aristotle asserts in Generation 
of Animals (concerning his observations about the generation of bees) “credit must 
be given rather to observation than to theories, and to theories only if what they 
affi rm agrees with the observed facts” (III 10, 760b 31). Through testing, we carry 
out a process of adapting models to the specifi c situations concerned. As Keynes 
maintains, “the specialist in the manufacture of models will not be successful unless 
he is constantly correcting his judgment by intimate and messy acquaintance with 
the facts to which his model has to be applied” (Keynes 1973: 300).
4 They might be added to the ordinary language words expressing causal concepts listed by Elizabeth 
Anscombe (1971: 93).
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Harold Kincaid (2008, pp. 596-7, cursive in the original) explains, 
If we have evidence that a model with unrealistic assumptions is 
picking out the causes of certain effects, then we can to that extent use it 
to explain, despite the “irrealism.” If I can show that my insight is that a 
particular causal process is operative, then I am doing more than reporting a 
warm feeling. If I can show that the same causal process is behind different 
phenomena, then unifi cation is grounded in reality. If I can provide evidence 
that I use my model as an instrument because it allows me to describe real 
causes, I can have confi dence in it. Finally, if I can show that the causes 
postulated in the model are operative in the world, I can begin to provide 
evidence that the model really does explain. 
The term “insight” used by Kincaid is often used by Keynes referring to the 
intellectual apprehension (see my paper 2008). It is also used by Kuipers (1961, 
p. 132): “Senses and intellect both play an active part in our shaping of the model 
and consequently in our obtaining an insight into the phenomena which cause us 
to try and fi nd explanations” (my cursive). “Good models” produce an intellectual 
apprehension of or insight into a possible cause. 
In sum, though they do so fallibly, models should identify causes in order 
to apprehend them. They need to be fi ne tuned through a process of verifi cation. 
Although I recognize that data are theory-laden and value-laden, I maintain that 
to “test, test and test” (D. Hendry 1980: 403) is the only way of refi ning the 
apprehension of cause. 
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